Q&A: Edward Wack
Strategy Leader
Planning Flexible, Agile Responses to CB Threats
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Edward Wack
Director of Future Acquisition
Joint Program Executive Office for
Chemical and Biological Defense
Edward Wack is the Director of Future Acquisition at the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD). He is responsible for leading the JPEO’s future technology strategy and coordinating that strategy with the other members of the chemical and biological defense program, civilian government organizations, and international partners. He is leading efforts to develop integrated system of systems concepts for CB defense. This includes defining the CBR system concepts for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) such as the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS).
Before joining the JPEO, Wack spent 13 years at MIT Lincoln Laboratory, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) administered by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Wack was an Assistant Group Leader in the Sensor Systems and Applications group where he led a team working on standoff sensing, advanced detection algorithms, and system architectures. He has also been involved in various aspects of satellite remote sensing programs including system architectures, sensor designs, sensor calibration and requirements analysis and definition.
Mr. Wack was inteviewed by MMT editor Jeff McKaughan.
Q: Comparing the urgency and push behind chemical/ biological efforts today to that from four or five years ago, what would you say are the biggest differences?
A: The difference today is not necessarily in the urgency or the push to mitigate CB threats. That objective remains at the core of our mission. The evolution in our efforts is in the “how” we develop material solutions to meet future needs. The change starts with capabilities definition and underscores the dynamic environment in which we must develop capability. The future threat is ill-defined regarding what we will face and the needs of our users are predicated on broad capability needs across the spectrum of military operations. CB defensive capabilities must be developed to fit in an environment that is defined by the necessity to be flexible and agile, for what we need to defend against will most likely change over time. Therefore our solution set must be designed up-front with this attribute in mind. In addition, the future is defined by the network and how we integrate capability for networked solutions. CB events are geo-temporal in their very nature. “Where is it, what is it and what can I do about it?” are vital questions that are now transmitted along a service-oriented architecture in command networks for leaders at all levels to make decisions. The faster these geo-temporal issues can be resolved, the greater flexibility the command has to make decisions to mitigate the effects. The biggest change is not what we are doing, but how we will need to develop capability for the future to maximize our effects for the networked users we support with modular and flexible solutions.
An example in the medical arena which underscores this approach is the Transformational Medical Technology Initiative in which the Department of Defense is making significant investment to resolve broad spectrum approaches to prophylaxes and therapeutics.
Q: How does your funding today compare with last year? Two years ago?
A: Army funding is roughly comparable for fiscal years 2005-2007.
Q: Perhaps based on funding, do you have a priority order to the main areas of detection, protection and decontamination where you focus more effort in one more than another?
A: In the CB Defense Program, priorities for capabilities are determined by the services and articulated in the Program Objective Memorandum as part of the DoD’s Program, Budget, and Execution System. We, in turn, resource our capabilities development to meet the joint service needs. These needs are respiratory/ocular protection, integrated early warning, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance, biological standoff, percutaneous protection, chemical standoff, biological prophylaxis, biological point detection, individual decontamination, and chemical point detection. Within these constructs the services, through the Joint Requirements Office, articulate their priorities, from which we assign resources to meet those needs.
These priorities, however, are only part of the story. Capability maturation and future systems are also part of the priorities we have provided to Defense Threat Reduction Agency in support of science and technology requirements.
Q: There has already been at least one use of an improvised explosive in Iraq that released a chemical vapor in addition to the actual explosive. Is your office working with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization [JIEDDO] or other offices, to coordinate detection and protection capabilities? Can you elaborate on any efforts in this area?
A: The Joint Program Executive Office for CB Defense [JPEOCBD] is coordinating with the Army, JIEDDO, and the Rapid Equipping Force to provide capabilities to the Explosive Ordnance Disposal units along with other general and specialized units to improve capabilities to mitigate emerging threats. The objective of this coordination is to provide improved detection and protection capabilities now to our forces confronting this threat.
We have fielded equipment to the theater of operations, including the Toxic Industrial Chemical Protection and Detection Equipment [TICPDE], which provides capability to respond to this and other threats. The kit provides advanced technologies for personal protection, detection and decontamination equipment commonly used by civilian responders to hazardous materials [HAZMAT] incidents. Protection and decontamination equipment is needed to safely employ TIC detection, identification and sampling equipment under most operational scenarios. Operators have the capability to prepare, extract, analyze and store environmental samples that were not possible previous to this fielding. The kit includes equipment for several different protective postures to provide the onscene commander with the flexibility to employ the least encumbering protective posture that the hazard [and] that operational situation will allow.
We are pursuing future material solutions in coordination with the Army and the other services that provide these types of opportunities in modular or integrated platforms. We are also experimenting in this area to determine how best to approach a modular concept.
Q: System development is sometimes characterized in relation to its alternative. For example, advances in armor protection were brought on by advances in antiarmor, which in turn grew from advances in armor. Is it possible to look at chem/bio protection in relation to the threat and say whether detection/protection is ahead of the threat curve or vice-versa?
A: The solution to mitigating the effects of CB agents and employment scenarios is not best described in a threat/counter threat loop, but a comprehensive system of systems approach based on modular, network-centric capabilities that leverage our strengths to mitigate broad spectrum CB threat scenarios and conditions. Material solutions are based on an understanding of the basic science associated with chemical and biological warfare agents and where we can find opportunities to deliver transformational capabilities that can be integrated into current and future force structures. The basic science of chemical and biological agents does not change though their delivery may. The more complete an understanding we have of the basic science questions about these agents the better our analyses of material alternatives and technology development strategies become. This is the premise of material solution development in the CBD Program.
Q: How much cooperation is there on an international level with partner nations to share information and programs relating to chemical and biological defense?
A: The DoD CBD Program has a proactive multi-lateral and bilateral strategy for engaging with our international partners in CB Defense. The JPEO-CBD participates in and looks for opportunities for technical data exchange and cooperation under such programs as the Technical Cooperation Program, Canada, United Kingdom, and United States Memorandum of Understanding [MOU], United States/ France General Officers Working Groups/Quadripartite Working Group [QWG]/Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense, QWG/Soldier, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mutual Development Data Exchange Agreement/Defense Development Exchange Program, International Materiel Evaluation program loans of equipment, and bilateral or multinational MOUs/Memorandums of Agreement.
Q: Animals are used in a variety of sensory roles, including detection of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive traces. Can you talk about some of the programs that center around animals or insects as detectors?
A: There are no efforts underway in DoD to use animals as sensors for CB agents. The JPEO-CBD certainly does not have anything in its portfolio in this direction.
Q: How does the sampling and detection equipment onboard the Stryker Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle [NBCRV] compare to that on the Fox NBCR System? What has the response been from the operators in the field on the Stryker NBCRV so far?
A: The NBCRV sensors provide NBC hazard detection and identification, ground surface sampling, meteorological data collection; communications, warning and reporting; marking of hazard areas; and global positioning. The platform and crew will determine the limits of and mark contaminated areas; take, store and transfer NBC samples for later analysis; and provide situational awareness through digital NBC warning and reporting. Enhanced features over the currently fielded M93A1 Fox NBC Reconnaissance System include biological detection and identification; onthe- move, stand-off chemical vapor detection; the ability to collect and store chemical vapor for later analysis and automatic electronic archiving of mission data.
The soldiers feel the system is robust. It brings a capability not previously available to the infantry brigade commander: mounted, ground CBRN reconnaissance with a specialized vehicle developed to develop and confirm information requirements in support of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process. In the past, CBRN reconnaissance was the purview of the division commander. The organization itself is new. It is composed of three systems; other Fox-based platoons are composed of six systems. It integrates chemical and biological capabilities. Previously, these very different capabilities were in separate units operated by chemical soldiers with different additional skill identifiers [ASIs]. The NBCRV soldiers receive a new ASI, L6, at the successful completion of their training. The NBCRV is as survivable as the remainder of the brigade, reducing the security burden on the brigade, and is as lethal as the balance of the systems with a M2 .50-cal heavy machine gun and AT-4 light anti-armor weapon. All-inall, this system will considerably increase the situational awareness and sustainment capabilities in the brigade.
Q: When you are looking at equipment solutions to requirements, how much importance do you place on having training devices and/or simulators available from the start?
A: The best material solutions are useless if they are not employed correctly. Total fielding includes providing the necessary training and documentation to ensure that the equipment is operated properly. Having effective training strategies and devices/ simulators to accompany the material fielding is of such importance to the JPEO-CBD that training devices and simulators are required to be developed in parallel, as part of the acquisition process.
Q: Are there any plans to relocate the JPEO to Edgewood to share locations with the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center?
A: Two joint project managers are already located on the Aberdeen Proving Ground in the Edgewood Area. The Base Realignment And Closure [BRAC] 2005 Implementation Plan directs the realignment and relocation of JPEO-CBD activities located in leased spaces in Falls Church, Va., and the establishment of a Joint Center of Excellence for Chemical-Biological Defense research, development and acquisition. We are working with the assistant chief of Staff for Installation Management to develop a plan that best addresses the needs of the CBD Program and meets BRAC intent. This plan will most likely include the relocation of some JPEO-CBD activities to ECBC. ♦